Alice, who does not have any sophisticated quantum technology, delegates her quantum computing to Bob, who has a fully-fledged quantum computer. Can she check whether the computation Bob performs for her is correct? She cannot recalculate the result by herself, since she does not have any quantum computer. A recent experiment with photonic qubits [1] suggests she can. Here, I explain the basic idea of the result, and recent developments about secure cloud quantum computing.
First-generation quantum computers will be implemented in the cloud style, since only limited groups, such as governments and large companies, will be able to possess such expensive and high-maintenance machines. How can client's privacy be protected? How can the client be convinced of the correctness of the result although she does not have any quantum computer?
Imagine that you do online shopping. Of course, you do not want to reveal your private information, such as what you bought, your credit card number, and your home address, etc. to someone else. Alternatively, imagine that a pharmaceutical company uses a time-sharing service of a super-computer provided by an electric company to run their own molecular dynamics program. The pharmaceutical company must want to make sure that the program, which is their top secret, will not be divulged. In short, securing client's privacy in cloud computing is one of the most central problems in today's digital society. In fact, there has been a long research history in classical cryptography on this problem, and several important results have been obtained (such as the famous fully homomorphic encryption by Gentry [2] ).
In quantum computing, Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [3] proposed in 2009 a protocol of secure cloud quantum computing which uses the measurement-based quantum computation [4] . In the protocol, Alice needs only a device that emits randomly-rotated single-qubit states. Bob has a sufficient technology to conduct the universal measurement-based quantum computing. Alice sends many randomly-rotated single-qubit states to Bob, and after that Alice and Bob perform some twoway classical communications. It was shown in Ref. [3] that if Bob is honest, Alice can obtain the correct output (correctness), and whatever the malicious Bob does, he cannot learn anything about Alice's input, the program, or the result of the computation (blindness). The protocol was experimentally demonstrated with photonic qubits in 2012 [5] .
Plenty of theoretical developments have also been done since then [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . For example, it was pointed out in Ref. [7] that in stead of single-photon states, Alice has only to generate weak coherent pulses. It was * Electronic address: morimae@gunma-u.ac.jp also shown in Ref. [11, 12] that single-qubit measurements are also enough for Alice. The original blind protocol that uses the cluster state has been generalized to other resource states, such as Affleck-Kennedy-LiebTasaki (AKLT) state [8] , Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal topological state [9] , and the continuous-variable cluster state [10] , etc. The communication complexity between Alice and Bob was also studied [17, 18] . In this way, malicious Bob cannot learn Alice's information. However, there is another problem: he can still tamper with it! If malicious Bob wants to fool Alice, he can forge the result, or just deviate from the correct procedure. Then, the result of the computation is no longer correct, but Alice has to accept the wrong result, since she cannot check the correctness of the result by herself (remember that she does not have any quantum computer). How can Alice avoid such an unpleasant situation? In the above example of the pharmaceutical company, such a question is crucial, since the pharmaceutical company, who pays a huge amount of money for the service, does not want to be palmed off with a wrong result by a fishy company trying to sell a fake quantum computer.
A protocol is called verifiable if the probability that the client accepts a wrong result can be sufficiently small. In Ref. [6] , Fitzsimons and Kashefi improved the BroadbentFitzsimons-Kashefi protocol [3] so that it is verifiable. (See also Refs. [11, 20] for other verification protocols.) The basic idea of these verifiable protocols is to hide "trap" qubits in the computation. Bob does not know the position of the traps, and therefore he touches a trap and changes its state with a certain probability if he de-viates from the correct procedure. Alice checks the trap qubits, and accepts the result of the computation only if no trap is altered. The probability that Alice accepts a wrong result is the probability that the lucky Bob can alter computational information without touching any trap. If Alice uses a quantum error correcting code, she can make such a probability exponentially small: if the computation is encoded with a quantum error correcting code, Bob has to apply some global operations to alter the logical state, and such a requirement of global operations drastically increases the probability of the server touching a trap. (An analogy is that a tank will more likely hit a land mine than a pedestrian, because the tank sweeps larger space.)
A full implementation of verification protocols [6, 11, 20] is, however, very challenging with current technology. In [1] , the authors provide a simplified protocol feasible with current technology, and demonstrate it using four photonic qubits. The simplification trades off some advantages of the original protocol [6] (and Ref. [11] ), such as the above mentioned exponentially small probability of accepting a wrong result, and therefore many runs of protocols are necessary. Furthermore, generalizations of their simplified protocol tuned for four qubits to non-scalable but many-qubit quantum computers are not clear. However, the essential idea that hiding traps can detect malicious Bob is cleverly achieved in spite of the four qubits limitation, and therefore their result is the first important proof-of-principle demonstration of testing quantum server.
Interestingly, verification is an important concept not only in cryptography but also in foundations of physics and computer science [19, 20] . Ultimately, physics is the activity of theoretically predicting a phenomenon, and experimentally confirming it. However, the behavior of a quantum many-body system is notoriously too complicated to be efficiently simulated on a classical computer, and therefore such a prediction-and-confirmation paradigm will break down in the many-body limit. A verification method is expected to be a solution: it enables an experimentalist who has only limited quantum technology to "verify" that a quantum many-body system in front of her is correctly evolving according to her theory.
Isn't it very exciting that a study of cryptography will shed new light on the foundation of physics?
